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Abstract
A growing body of research finds that firm-specific pay premiums are a key deter-
minant of wage inequality. These premiums will magnify the gender wage gap if women
receive smaller premiums at any given firm, as suggested by the literature on gender
differences in bargaining, or if women are less likely to work at high-paying firms. Using
longitudinal data on the hourly wages of Portuguese workers matched to balance sheet
information for firms, we show that the wages of both men and women contain firm-
specific premiums that are strongly correlated with employer productivity. We then
show how the impact of these firm-specific pay differentials on the gender wage gap can
be decomposed into a combination of bargaining and sorting effects. Consistent with
the bargaining literature, we find that women receive only 90% of the firm-specific pay
premiums earned by men. Notably, we obtain very similar estimates of the relative
bargaining power ratio from our analysis of between-firm wage premiums and from an-
alyzing changes in firm-specific premiums over time. We also find that women are less
likely to work at firms that pay higher premiums to either gender, with sorting effects
being most important for lower skilled workers. Taken together, the bargaining and
sorting effects explain about one-fifth of the cross-sectional gender wage gap in Portu-
gal. Our results suggest that regulatory policies aimed at ensuring equal pay are likely
to have their greatest benefit for high skilled women, whereas policies ensuring that
women are fairly represented in the hiring pool of firms will have effects throughout the
skill distribution.
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Labor market frictions give employers some control over wages.1 In a typical frictional
equilibrium more profitable firms pay higher wages and workers search between jobs in pursuit
of higher pay.2 While a growing body of evidence confirms that inter-firm wage differentials
are a significant source of wage variability,3 there is as yet no systematic analysis of the role
of firm wage policies in the gender wage gap. Nevertheless, two long-established strands of
research suggest that firm policies may be important for understanding male/female wage
differences. One emphasizes the role of bargaining and the possibility that women negotiate
less aggressively than men (e.g., Bowles et al., 2005, 2007; Babcock et al. 2006).4 The
other focuses on the relative rate that women move to higher-paying jobs (e.g., Loprest,
1992; Hospido, 2009; del Bono and Vuri, 2011).5 These studies point to two complementary
channels for generating gender disparities: a bargaining channel that arises if women obtain
a smaller share of the surplus associated with any given job, and a sorting channel that arises
if women are less likely to be employed at higher-wage firms.
In this paper we provide the first comprehensive analysis of the impact of firm-specific
pay policies on the gender wage gap, using matched worker-firm data from Portugal that
combines detailed information on the earnings of private sector employees with balance sheet
data for employers.6 Building on a simple rent-sharing model, we show how the bargaining
and sorting channels can be measured using a Oaxaca-style decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973;
Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo, 2011) of gender-specific firm wage effects of the sort first studied
by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) – hereafter, AKM. This model includes fixed effects
for individual workers and fixed effects for employers that measure the wage premiums paid
by each firm relative to some reference firm (or group of firms). A key issue for assessing the
contribution of the bargaining channel is the need to define the relevant reference group for
each gender, a problem noted earlier by Oaxaca and Ransom (1999). Based on the observed
relationship between the estimated wage premiums and firm-specific productivity, we adopt
the assumption that firms in the lowest decile of productivity pay zero rents to men and
women – an assumption that generates a lower-bound estimate of differential bargaining
power of women.
Since our decomposition approach builds directly on the two-way fixed effects AKM
model, we begin our empirical analysis by providing non-parametric evidence on the plausi-
1See Manning (2003) and Lenz and Mortensen (2010) for overviews of theoretical models of frictional
labor markets.
2See for example Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Coles and Mortensen (2012) and Moscarini and Postel
Vinay (2013).
3See Abowd and Kramarz (1999) for earlier work, and Card, Heining and Kline (2013) for a brief review
of more recent studies.
4See Bertrand (2011) for a review. Related bodies of work suggest that women are less competitive and
less confident than men, and as a result tend to choose educational tracks, occupations, and jobs that are
associated with lower wages, e.g., Gneezy et al (2003), Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), and Buser et al.
(2013).
5A related literature looks at between-firm distribution of employment by gender: e.g., Groshen (1991)
and Petersen and Morgan (1995). Another set of studies focus on mobility rates of men and women without
focusing on wage outcomes of the moves, e.g., Royalty (1998).
6An earlier study by Nekby (2003) relates male and female wages to measured profitability in a cross
section of Swedish firms, but does not address the potential selectivity issues caused by non-random sorting
of men and women with different unobserved skill characteristics to more profitable firms. Barth and Dale-
Olsen (2009) examine firm-specific gender wage differences in a monopsony framework.
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bility of the assumptions under which OLS estimates of this model are unbiased. We show
that these assumptions can be tested by examining the wage trends of job movers before
and just after they change jobs, and by comparing the wage changes for people who move
from one group of firms to another to the corresponding changes for those who move in the
opposite direction. Corroborating earlier evidence for Germany by Card, Heining and Kline
(2013), and for Italy by Macis and Schivardi (2013), we find that these assumptions are at
least approximately satisfied for both men and women in Portugal. Comparing the average
wage changes for men and women who move between matched sets of firms we also find that
women benefit less from firm-to-firm mobility than men.
We then estimate separate AKM models for male and female workers in Portugal. We find
that firm-specific pay premiums explain about 20% of observed wage variation among both
men and women, while positive assortative matching (i.e., the positive covariation between
worker and firm effects) explains another 10%. The firm-specific pay premiums for men and
women are also highly (but imperfectly) correlated across firms. Decomposing the estimated
firm premiums for firms that employ both male and female workers, we find that women
benefit less than men from firm-specific pay policies. Part of the shortfall – up to 5% of the
overall gender wage gap in Portugal – is attributable to the fact that women gain less than
men from higher-wage firms. A larger share – 15% or more of the overall gender gap – is
explained by the under-representation of women at high-wage firms. In total, firm-specific
pay policies explain just over one-fifth of the average gender wage gap. We also examine
the contributions of firm wage policies to the gender gaps by age and education group, and
between workers in mainly female and mainly male occupations. We find gender differences
persist even within occupation groups. We also find that sorting effects are more important
among less skilled workers and bargaining effects greater among the high skilled.
We then narrow our focus to the component of the firm-specific wage premiums paid to
men and women that is directly related to measured productivity. We find that women’s
wages are only 90% as responsive to average value added per worker as men’s, and we
can easily reject the hypothesis of equal responsiveness, thus confirming that women gain a
smaller share of firm-wide rents than their male co-workers. We also confirm that women are
under-represented at firms with higher measured profitability. Bargaining and sorting based
on measured productivity account for about 80% of the overall impact of firm-specific pay
policies on the gender wage gap.
As a final step in our analysis we examine the effects of changes in firm-specific profitability
on the wage changes of men and women who remain with the firm over a multi-year period.
This approach, which mirrors the design employed in the modern rent-sharing literature (e.g.,
van Reenen, 1996; Carlsson, Messina, and Skans, 2011; Card, Devicienti and Maida, 2013),
uses an entirely different (and orthogonal) component of wage variation than our analysis
of firm-specific pay premiums. Reassuringly, we obtain a nearly identical 90% estimate of
women’s relative bargaining power.
We conclude that, in the aggregate, firm-specific pay policies explain a fifth of the gender
wage gap in Portugal, with about three quarters of this effect arising through a between-firm
sorting channel, and one quarter arising through a relative bargaining power channel. While
modest in size, the relative bargaining power effect provides important confirmation of the
hypothesis that women gain a smaller share of the rents than their male colleagues. Indeed,
we suspect that our 90% estimate of the relative bargaining power of women in Portugal is
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likely to exceed the relative bargaining power of women in other labor markets where there
are fewer institutional constraints on wages. Our findings also contribute to the growing
body of research showing that firm-specific pay policies are a fundamental determinant of
earnings inequality and the structure of wages.
1 Firm-specific Determinants of the Gender Wage Gap
In traditional competitive labor market models, wages are determined by market-level supply
and demand factors rather than the wage policies of particular firms or the tenacity of par-
ticular workers (or, in the parlance of Sheryl Sanberg (2013)’s recent bestselling monograph
on the subject, a worker’s willingness to “lean-in”).7 A market-based perspective is central
to Becker’s (1957) model of employer-based discrimination. In Becker’s model a market-wide
discriminatory wage premium is determined by the preferences of the marginal employer
of women. The mean wage gap between men and women then depends on their relative
skills and a constant that reflects the supply of less-discriminatory firms.8 Building on this
framework, most studies of the gender wage gap focus on measured skill differences between
men and women and treat any unexplained component as a combination of discriminatory
factors and unobserved skill gaps (see Altonji and Blank, 1999 and Blau and Kahn, 2000, for
reviews).
Despite the market-level focus of most economic studies, legislation aimed at eliminating
gender discrimination is primarily directed at firms. In the U.S., for example, the Equal Pay
Act requires that employers offer equal pay to men and women for “substantially equal” work,
while Title VII of the Civil Rights Act probits firms from discriminating against women (and
other protected groups) in decisions over hiring, layoffs, and promotions. Similarly, audit-
based studies of potential discrimination (e.g., Heckman and Siegelman, 1993; Neumark
et al., 1996; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003) examine the hiring practices of individual
employers. Anti-discriminatory policies such as the use of blind auditions by orchestras
(Goldin and Rouse, 2000) also focus on firm-specific behaviors.9
The emerging literature on frictional labor markets provides a framework for understand-
ing how firm-level behavior can matter for the gender wage gap.10 To the extent that firms
have some control over the wages offered to a given worker, the average wages of women rel-
ative to men will be affected by two factors. The first is whether firms pay different average
7Firms can still “matter” for observed wage outcomes if there are (market-based) compensating differ-
entials for firm-wide amenities or disamenities, or if there is firm-specific human capital accumulation that
is rewarded in pay. Moreover, the preferences of owners and coworkers can easily lead to perfectly segre-
gated firms in such models precisely because wages are assumed not to adjust. Robinson’s (1933) model of
monopsonistic wage setting was motivated in part by trying to explain why a firm might pay lower wages to
women than men. As pointed out by Barth and Dale-Olsen (2009), this framework has been largely ignored
in the gender wage literature. Lang and Lehmann (2012) discuss models of employer wage setting in a racial
discrimination context.
8See Charles and Guryan (2008, 2011) for a recent application to the black-white wage gap and reviews
of related work.
9Giuliano et al (2009) show that changes in the race of a manager responsible for hiring can affect the
fraction of non-whites who are hired. Such evidence suggests that a “firm’s” policies and practices may be
endogenous to the characteristics of its workforce.
10See Manning (2003) for a discussion of gender-related pay differences in a wage posting model.
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wage premiums for men and women relative to the “market” (or a reference employer). The
second is whether firms that pay higher wages, on average, are more or less likely to hire
women.
One reason to suspect that the wage premiums paid to women and men may differ in
a frictional labor market equilibrium is the finding in the social psychology literature that
women are less likely than men to initiate negotiations with their employer (Babcock and
Lashever, 2003; Bowles et al., 2007), and in (lab-based) negotiation games are typically less
successful negotiators.11 As noted by Hall and Krueger (2012) about one-third of U.S. workers
report having bargained with their employer over their starting wage. Any gender difference
in bargaining behavior might be expected to translate into lower wages for people in these
types of jobs. In fact, a study of Swedish college graduates by Save-Soderbergh (2007) found
that women who obtained jobs where they were asked to submit a salary demand at the start
of the job tended to ask for lower salaries (and ended up receiving lower salaries) than men.
The literature on inter-firm mobility and career progression provides additional insight
into the potential role of firms in mediating the gender wage gap. Loprest (1992) documents
that young women in the U.S. are about as likely to move between firms as young men, but
experience smaller wage gains than men from each move. Similar patterns are reported for
Italy by Del Bono and Vuri (2011) and for Spain by Hospido (2009). The smaller wage gains
for women may be due to less aggressive negotiating by women at the start of their jobs.
They could also arise because women place greater weight than men on non-wage factors like
distance to home and hours flexibility in choosing between the job offered by different firms,
and are therefore less likely to move simply to raise their wages.
Both sources of gender differences are targeted by labor market regulations. Equal pay
regulations aim to limit the scope of employers to bargain differently with men and women.
Fair hiring rules ensure that hiring pools contain a proportionate share of women. However,
empirically assessing the relative importance of the bargaining and sorting channels for the
overall gender wage gap requires a rich enough data set that we can observe men and women
making transitions to and from the same firms.
2 Institutional Setting and Data Overview
Our analysis relies on a unique matched employer-employee data set from Portugal containing
high-quality data on worker’s wages and firm profitability. While our focus on Portugal is
data-driven, three features of the Portuguese labor market suggest that our findings may be
broadly generalizable to other settings. First, women in Portugal have relatively high labor
force participation rates, comparable to the rates in the U.S. and Northern Europe – e.g., 58%
for all adult women in 2010 (ILO, 2012). The participation rate of women between the ages
of 25 and 45 is particularly high (over 85%) reflecting the strong commitment to work among
recent cohorts of women (INE, 2013). Second, the vast majority of women in Portugal (over
11Stuhlmacher and Meyers (1999) present a meta analysis of studies of gender in the bargaining literature
from the 1974-1996 period. Nearly all the studies in their sample are from lab experiments. They conclude
that on average women obtain a smaller surplus than men - their estimate of the differnential is 10% of the
standard deviation of the surplus share among men and women combined. Rigdon (2012) presents a lab
experiment based on the Demand-Ultimatum game, and finds relatively large differences between male and
female players, both in terms of cheap talk during the game and the game outcomes.
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90% of those in private sector jobs) work full time. As a result, wage comparisons between
men and women are unlikely to be driven by differences between full time and part time jobs.
Third, the gender wage gap in Portugal is within a few percentage points of the gaps in the
U.S. and U.K., and very close to the OECD-wide average.12
Most jobs in Portugal are covered by sector-wide pay agreements negotiated by employer
associations and trade unions. Since these contracts are gender-neutral (i.e., they set wages
for jobs regardless of gender), they arguably exert some equalizing effect on the relative pay
of women.13 Nevertheless, employers have wide latitude in assigning newly hired employees
to job categories and in deciding who to promote to higher categories. In addition, most
male and female workers earn substantial wage premiums over the base pay rates for their
job category (Cardoso and Portugal, 2005). We suspect that these features lessen the impact
of sectoral bargaining on the gender pay gap and leave substantial room for firm-specific
factors to affect the relative wages of women.
2.1 Data Sources
Our wage data are derived from the Quadros de Pessoal (QP), an annual census of private
sector employees conducted by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment. Firms with at least
one paid employee are required to submit information on their full workforce as of the survey
reference week (in October). Government employees and individuals working as independent
contractors are excluded from coverage.14 Over our 8-year sample period from 2002 to 2009
we have useable information on 4 million workers at 500,000 firms.
The QP asks firms to report each employee’s gender, education, occupation, date of hire,
regular monthly salary, wage supplements, and hours of work. Information is also collected
on the industry, location, and founding date of the firm, and gross sales in the preceding
calendar year. We construct hourly wages by dividing each worker’s normal salary and
regular earnings supplements by his or her normal hours of work. The availability of hours
information is a unique strength of the QP and reduces the potential impact of differential
hours of work between men and women on the gender wage gap.15
We augment the information in the QP with balance sheet information from the “SABI”
(Sistema de Analisis de Balances Ibericos) database. Businesses in Portugal are required
to file annual balance sheets and profit and loss statements.16 These reports are publicly
accessible and are collected by various financial service firms and assembled into the SABI
12The OECD “Family database” shows the gender gap in median full time earnings was 16% in Portugal,
19% in the U.S., and 16% on average across 26 OECD countries (OECD, 2012).
13Freeman and Leonard (1987) showed that trade unions in the U.S. have a (small) narrowing effect on
the gender wage gap.
14Firm owners are included in the data set but do not report wages, and so are excluded from our analysis.
Individuals who are on temporary leave (e.g., sick leave or maternity) are included in the data set, but those
with no employer in the reference week are excluded.
15Differences in hours of work between men and women play a major role in explaining earnings differences
in the U.S., particularly among the highly skilled. Wood, Corcoran and Courant (1993) and Bertrand,
Goldin and Katz (2010) find important hours gaps between male and female lawyers and MBA graduates,
respectively.
16These are filed with the Conservatoria do Registro Comercial. The same agency also keeps track of
changes in ownership and organizational structure of firms. Based on informal discussions with firm owners
we believe the penalties for non-filing are small, possibly accounting for missing data for many firms.
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database by Bureau van Dijk. Information in SABI includes the firm’s name, address, indus-
try, and founding date, as well as balance sheet data and total employment. SABI data are
available from 2000 onward, but coverage of the database was relatively incomplete before
2006.
Since the QP does not include firm names or tax identification codes we use a combina-
tion of other variables that are reported in both QP and SABI to perform a fuzzy match.
Specifically, we use location, industry code, firm creation date, annual sales, and end-of-year
shareholder capital as matching variables. As described in the Data Appendix, we success-
fully match about 53% of firms that appear in the QP between 2002 and 2009 to a firm with
at least one year’s information in SABI. More information on our matching procedure and
the match rates for various subgroups is presented in the Data Appendix. Overall we have
current-year employer financial data for about 66% of the person-year observations in our
QP sample from 2006-2009.
2.2 Descriptive Overview
As background for our analysis we begin by presenting a brief overview of the differences
between male and female employees in Portugal. We focus on individuals who are between
19 and 65 years of age, have more than one year of potential labor market experience, and
worked as a paid employee in the QP reference week. Our primary analysis sample – described
in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 – contains annual wage observations from 2002 to 2009 for 2.1
million men and 1.7 million women.17
Comparisons between the two columns show that female workers in Portugal are slightly
younger than their male counterparts but are more likely to have competed secondary or
tertiary education. Despite this education advantage women earn about 18% less per hour
than men – very similar to the gender gap in median hourly wages in the U.S. in 2007 (EPI,
2010). Women also work slightly fewer hours per month, though the difference (3%) is small
by international standards.18 The dispersion in monthly hours is larger for women than men
while the dispersion in hourly wages is smaller. Thirty-five percent of both male and female
employees work in the Lisbon area, another 13 percent work in the Porto area, and the
remainder work in smaller cities and rural areas.
As shown in Figure 1, the gender wage gap in Portugal was gradually narrowing over our
sample period, reflecting stagnant real wages for men and modest wage growth for women.
In the final year of our sample period nominal wages of men and women rose by about 3%
(the same pace as in the previous 6 years) but the rate of inflation dropped sharply, causing
a jump in real wages for both genders and leaving the gender wage gap at 16 percent.
Looking at workplace characteristics, women tend to work at larger firms than men (858
employees vs. 730), a characteristic that is also true in the U.S. and the U.K.19 More striking
17See the Data Appendix for details on the derivation of this sample, and comparisons with the overall
population of 16-65 year old workers in the QP. In the small number of cases where an individual is employed
at two or more firms in the reference week, we assign them to their highest earnings job.
18Data reported by the OECD (2012) for Portugal (based on labor force survey data that includes the
government sector and independent contract workers excluded from QP) shows part-time employment rates
for men and women of 8% and 14%, respectively. The same source shows part-time employment rates for
men and women in the US of 8% and 17%.
19Papps (2012) and Mumford and Smith (2008) report roughly 10% larger workplace sizes for women than
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is the difference in the share of female employees at women’s and men’s workplaces -70%
vs. 24%. This gap means that there is significant gender segregation across firms.20 Indeed,
about 21% of men work at all-male firms, while 19% of women work at all-female firms.21
The presence of single-gender firms poses a problem for assessing the role of firms in the
gender wage gap, since we cannot observe the wages that would be offered to women at
all-male firms, or to men at all-female firms. For most of our analysis below we therefore
limit attention to firms that hire at least one worker of each gender at some point in our
sample period. Wages at single-gender firms tend to be relatively low, particularly for men:
the mean log wage for men at all-male firms is 1.28 (31% below the average for all men) while
the mean wage for women at all-female firms is 1.19 (22% below the average for all women).
Paradoxically, the presence of single-gender firms therefore contributes to a narrowing of the
gender wage gap relative to the gap at integrated firms.
3 Modeling Framework
We now develop an econometric model that allows us to evaluate the effect of firm-specific
pay policies on the observed wages of women and men. Assume that we observe the point-
in-time wages of a group of workers (indexed by i ∈ {1, ..., N}) in multiple periods (indexed
by t ∈ {1, ..., T}). We denote worker i’s gender by G (i) which takes on values in the set
{F,M}, and the identity of his or her employer in a given year by J (i, t) which takes on
values in the set {1, ..., J}. We refer to a particular gender as g and a particular firm as j.
We posit a rent-sharing model where the logarithm of the real wage earned by individual
i in period t (wit) is determined by:
wit = ait + γ
G(i)SiJ(i,t)t. (1)
Here, ait represents the alternative wage available to worker i in period t, SiJ(i,t)t ≥ 0 is the
match surplus between the worker and firm J (i, t) in period t, and γg ∈ [0, 1] is a gender-
specific share of the surplus captured by a worker of gender g ∈ {F,M}. In light of studies
such as Bowles et al. (2005, 2007) we are specifically interested in the question of whether
women get a smaller share of the surplus associated with their job (i.e. γF < γM).
We assume that SiJ(i,t)t can be decomposed into three components:
SiJ(i,t)t = S¯J(i,t) + φJ(i,t)t +miJ(i,t). (2)
The first term, S¯J(i,t), captures time-invariant factors like market power or brand recognition
that raise the overall profitability of the firm. The second component φJ(i,t)t captures random
time-varying factors that potentially raise or lower the overall rents available at the firm.
men in the U.S. and U.K., respectively.
20Mumford and Smith (2008, online Appendix Table A2) report that in the U.K. in 2004 the average
fraction of female employees at the workplace was 70% for women and 34% for men, which implies somewhat
less segregation by gender than in Portugal. We are unaware of any broad estimates of the degree of gender
segregation in the US.
21Construction and trade account for 43% and 20%, respectively, of the person-year observations at all-
male jobs. All-female workplaces are prevalent in trade (23% of person-years at all female firms), health
services (17%), hotels (14%), and textiles (13%).
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The third component in equation (2) captures any person-specific surplus associated with
the match between the worker and the firm, due for example to idiosyncratic skills or job
requirements.
We also assume that the alternative wage ait can be decomposed into a permanent compo-
nent αi (due, for example, to ability or general skills), a time-varying component associated
with an observed set of characteristics Xit (e.g., labor market experience and changing returns
to education), and a transitory component εit:
ait = αi +X
′
itβ
G(i) + εit, (3)
where βg is a gender specific vector of coefficients.
Equations (1) through (3) imply the wage of worker i in period t takes the form:





G(i) + rit, (4)
where ψ
G(i)




+ εit is a composite error. Equa-
tion (4) is consistent with an additive “two-way” worker-firm effects model of the type con-
sidered by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) and many subsequent authors, with person
effects, gender-specific firm effects, and gender-specific returns to the covariates Xit.
3.1 Exogeneity
We estimate models based on equation (4) by OLS, yielding gender-specific sets of firm effects.






) |G (i)] = 0 ∀j ∈ {1, ..., J} , (5)
where Djit ≡ 1 [J (i, t) = j] is an indicator for employment at firm j in period t and bars
over variables represent time averages. To develop insight into the substantive restrictions
involved in (5), it is useful to consider the special case where T = 2. With two time periods,







) |G(i)] = 0 ∀j ∈ {1, ..., J}. (6)




takes on values of +1 for workers who move to firm j in






) |G(i)] = E [ri2 − ri1|Dji2 = 1, Dji1 = 0, G(i)]
×P (Dji2 = 1, Dji1 = 0|G (i))
−E [ri2 − ri1|Dji2 = 0, Dji1 = 1, G(i)]
×P (Dji2 = 0, Dji1 = 1|G (i)) .
The term E
[
ri2 − ri1|Dji2 = 1, Dji1 = 0, G(i)
]
gives the mean change in the unobserved
wage determinants for the joiners of firm j, while the term E
[
ri2 − ri1|Dji2 = 0, Dji1 = 1, G(i)
]
gives the corresponding change for the leavers of this firm. Clearly, if worker mobility is
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independent of all three components in the composite error term these expectations will be
zero and OLS will be unbiased. Even if the expected changes in the residuals of joiners and
leavers are non-zero, these biases will cancel out if the biases for leavers and joiners are the
same, and if the probabilities of joining and leaving firm j are also equal, which will true if
the firm’s employment is in a steady state.
It is illustrative to consider potential reasons why workers joining (or leaving) a given
firm might have unusual values of the change in their residual wage terms:
ri2 − ri1 = γG(i)
[
φJ(i,2)2 − φJ(i,1)1 +miJ(i,2) −miJ(i,1)
]
+ εi2 − εi1.
One reason is that mobility is related to the firm-wide shocks φjt. For example, workers may
be more likely to leave firms that are experiencing negative shocks and join firms that are
experiencing positive shocks. If this is true, however, then we would expect to see systematic
dips in the wages of leavers just prior to their exit, and a corresponding pattern of unusual
wage growth for recent joiners. We look for such patterns below and find no evidence that
they are present in the data.
A second source of correlation arises if workers tend to move to firms where they have
a larger positive match effect (mij) and leave those where they have a smaller match effect.
Indeed, mobility based on “comparative advantage” in wages is assumed in many formal
models of worker-firm matching. A direct implication of such mobility is that workers who
move from one firm to another will tend to experience wage changes of a different magnitude
than people who move in the opposite direction. For example, suppose that firm1 offers a
10% larger average premium than 2. If mobility is independent of the match effects obtained
by workers at the two firms, movers from firm 1 to firm 2 will experience a 10% average
wage gain, while movers from firm 2 to firm 1 will experience a 10% average wage loss. If
mobility is based in part on comparative advantage, however, then movers will on average
experience a larger (more positive) match effect at their destination firm than at their origin
firm, offsetting some of the change in the average wage premium. In the limit, if all firm
moves are voluntary and selection is based solely on the match components, all moves will
lead to wage gains. In our analysis below we test for symmetry (i.e., equal magnitude and
opposite sign) between the wage changes of workers moving in opposite directions between
groups of firms, and find that it is approximately satisfied. This symmetry is inconsistent
with selection on the match component of wages.
A third reason that wage errors might be correlated with mobility is that workers select
into firms based on the transitory shocks in their earnings (εit). For example, a worker who
is performing well and receiving promotions might be more likely to move to a higher wage
firm, while workers who are stalled in their job might be more likely to move down the job
ladder to a lower-paying firm. Systematic mobility of this form implies that movers will have
different wage trends than firm stayers, and that people moving to higher-wage firms will
have different trends prior to moving than those who move to lower-wage firms. Again, in
our analysis below we find no evidence for any of these predictions.
A final question is: What drives firm-to-firm mobility if it is not related to the match
component of wages or the transitory errors? The most straightforward explanation is that
worker-firm matching is based on a combination of the permanent component of worker
ability (the αi component in equation 4) and the average wage premium offered by the firm.
If, for example, skilled workers are more likely to engage in on the job search, they will climb
10
the firm job ladder faster than their less skilled peers. Likewise, firms may be reticent to
lay off their most skilled workers in a downturn, which will lead to excess downward firm
mobility among the less skilled. Such sorting creates no bias in the estimated worker and firm
effects because OLS conditions on time invariant worker and firm effects. Another source
of mobility that is consistent with equation (5) is sorting based on non-wage dimensions,
such as the geographic location of the firm, recruiting effort, or firm size. Similarly, sorting
based on networks of friends or family members (as in Kramarz and Skans, 2013) will lead
to mobility patterns that are consistent with equation (5).
3.2 Normalization
Exogeneity is necessary but not sufficient for identification of firm effects. As explained by
Abowd, Creecy, and Kramarz (2002) firm effects are only identified up to a normalizing
constant within each “connected set” of firms linked by worker mobility – that is, the set
of firms that have movers in common. In our analysis below we limit attention to workers
and firms in the largest connected set for each gender. Even within a single connected set
of firms, we still require a linear restriction on each gender’s firm effects for identification.
Intuitively, if a female worker moves from firm j to firm k, we can only use her wage history
to infer the difference in female wage premiums between these firms. The levels of the wage
premiums are not identified.
According to our simple model, the true firm effects for each gender should be non-
negative, and zero at firms that offer no surplus above a worker’s alternative wage. Using
measured value added per worker as a proxy for the average surplus at a given firm, we
impose the normalization that firms with an observed level of value added per worker below
a threshold level τ have a (person-year weighted) mean firm effect of zero for both genders.22
More precisely, letting V Aj denote the average log value added per worker at firm j over the
sample period, we assume that:
E
[
ψgJ(i,t)|V AJ(i,t) ≤ τ
]
= 0 ∀g ∈ {F,M} (7)
If (7) is correct, then imposing this condition will yield a set of normalized firm effects
that coincide with the true firm effects. Otherwise, the normalized effects will be equal to the
true firm effects, minus the average value of the firm effects for firms with low value added.
While the normalized effects could, in principle, be estimated in a single step by constrained
least squares,23 we opt instead for a computationally convenient two-step approach: we first
estimate the gender specific firm effects via unrestricted OLS omitting a particular large
firm, then renormalize by subtracting off the average value of the gender-relevant firm effects
among low value added firms. We explain how we estimate the threshold τ in Section 5.3,
below.
As discussed below, this normalization procedure is substantively important for the wage
decompositions we conduct. Intuitively, if low value added firms still have positive surplus,
22The choice of the threshold τ is explained in section 3.4.






V Aj ≤ τ
]
= 0 where pj is the fraction
of person-year observations (among both genders) spent at firm j. This formulation would yield reductions
in the efficiency of the conjugate gradient algorithm we use to estimate the firm effects which exploits the
sparse banded structure of the design matrix that emerges when simply omitting a single firm dummy.
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we will understate the importance of gender differences in bargaining strength in generating
wage gaps because we have understated the amount of surplus present in the labor market.
3.3 Decomposing the Effect of Firm-Level Pay Policies
Equation (4) provides a simple framework for evaluating the impact of firm-level pay policies
on the gender wage gap. The average pay premium received by men is E[ψMJ(i,t)|G(i) = M ],
while the average pay premium received by women is E[ψFJ(i,t)|G(i) = F ]. As in the traditional
Oaxaca wage decomposition (see e.g., Oaxaca, 1973; Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo, 2011), we
can decompose the difference in pay premiums into the sum of a bargaining power effect and
a sorting effect in either of two ways:
E[ψJ(i,t)|G(i) = M ]− E[ψJ(i,t)|G(i) = F ] = E[ψMJ(i,t) − ψFJ(i,t)|G(i) = M ] (8)
+E[ψFJ(i,t)|G(i) = M ]− E[ψFJ(i,t)|G(i) = F ]
= E[ψMJ(i,t) − ψFJ(i,t)|G(i) = F ] (9)
+E[ψMJ(i,t)|G(i) = M ]− E[ψMJ(i,t)|G(i) = F ].
The first term in equation (8) is the average bargaining power effect, calculated by comparing
ψMj and ψ
F
j across the distribution of jobs held by men. The second term in (8) is the average
sorting effect, calculated by comparing the average value of ψFj across the jobs held by men
versus women. In the alternative decomposition (equation 9) the bargaining power effect is
calculated using the distribution of jobs held by women, and the sorting effect is calculated
by comparing the average value of the male pay premiums across jobs held by men versus
women.
As noted by Oaxaca and Ransom (1999), the estimated sorting effect from either of
these expressions is invariant to the normalization chosen for the firm effects. The estimated
bargaining effect, however, is not invariant to the choice of normalization. Our procedure of
setting the estimated effects to 0 for a common set of low-value-added firms is equivalent to
subtracting different constants from the two sets of fixed effects. Subtracting off a different
set of constants will obviously lead to a different value for the first line of either equation
(8) or (9). It can be shown if γM > γF , and wages at low value added firms actually include
some rent component, then our choice of normalization will understate the bargaining effect.
Intuitively, this is because our approach subtracts off a relatively larger component of true
rents from the estimated male effects than from the estimated female effects
Note that under our assumed model of wage determination, the pay premiums for female
and male workers at a given firm j are related by:
ψFj = (γ
F/γM)ψMj . (10)
This suggests that we can estimate the relative bargaining power ratio γF/γM by examin-
ing the relationship between the estimated pay premiums for men and women across firms.
Since these estimated premiums contain sampling errors, we average the pay premiums across
groups of firms with similar characteristics and regress the average premium for female work-
ers in each group on the corresponding average premium for male workers, providing an
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estimate of γF/γM .24
We can also use this estimate of the relative bargaining power of women to perform a
consistency check on the magnitude of the bargaining power effects estimated from (8) or
(9). Re-arranging equation (10), notice that
ψMj − ψFj = (1− γF/γM)ψMj (11)
Thus, the model predicts that E[ψMJ(i,t) − ψFJ(i,t)|G (i)] =(1 − γF/γM)E[ψMJ(i,t)|G (i)]. If, for
example, the estimate of γF/γM is 0.9, then we expect that the estimated bargaining power
effects from (8) and (9) should be approximately 10% of the estimated average pay premiums
for men and women, respectively.
3.4 Relating the Estimated Firm Effects to Measures of Produc-
tivity
An alternative estimate of the relative bargaining power of male and female employees can be








0, V AJ(i,t) − τ
}
. (12)
Note that this formulation imposes our normalizing assumption that firms with average log
value added per worker below τ have no surplus. We refer to the quantity max
{
0, V AJ(i,t) − τ
}
as “excess average value added”, EV AJ(i,t). Given the value of τ (which we estimate in a
prior step, as explained in Section 5.3) we can write:
ψgJ(i,t) = pi
gEV AJ(i,t) + ν
g
J(i,t) (13)
where pig ≡ γgκ and E
[
νgJ(i,t)|EV AJ(i,t), G (i)
]
= 0. Notice that piF/piM = γF/γM . By taking
the ratio of the estimated gender specific slopes after estimating equation (13) for male and
female workers we obtain an additional estimate of the bargaining power ratio γF/γM .
We can also use equation (13) to decompose the part of the firm-specific pay premiums
received by men and women that is directly linked to our measure of firm-specific profitability.
Specifically, the gender gap in these components is:
E[piMEV AJ(i,t)|G(i) = M ]− E[piFEV AJ(i,t)|G(i) = F ]
= (piM − piF )E[EV AJ(i,t)|G(i) = M ] + piF
(
E[EV AJ(i,t)|G(i) = M ]
−E[EV AJ(i,t)|G(i) = F ]
)
(14)
= (piM − piF )E[EV AJ(i,t)|G(i) = F ] + piM
(
E[EV AJ(i,t)|G(i) = M ]
−E[EV AJ(i,t)|G(i) = F ]
)
. (15)
Focusing only on the part of the firm surplus that is correlated with our measure of prof-
itability, the contribution of the bargaining channel to the male-female wage gap is simply
24Assuming that the groups are equal-sized, this approach corresponds to an instrumental variables estimate
of the relationship given by (10), using as instruments the grouping dummy variables.
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the difference in coefficients (piM − piF ), weighted by excess average value added at men’s
jobs (equation 14) or at women’s jobs (equation 15). The corresponding contribution of the
sorting channel is the difference in mean excess value added at men’s jobs and women’s jobs,
weighted by either piF (equation 14) or piM (equation 15).
3.5 Within-Firm Changes in Productivity and Wages
While the main focus of this paper is on between-firm wage differences, our model also implies
that the wages of male and female employees who are observed working at the same firm over
time will respond differently to changes in firm surplus. Define V Ajt as the log value added
per worker at firm j in year t and Sjt ≡ S¯j+φjt as the firm-wide surplus in period t. Building
on our normalization assumption, we assume that the surplus available for rent-sharing in
period t is a function of the excess value added per worker at the firm in that period (EV Ajt):
SJ(i,t)t = λmax
{
0, V AJ(i,t)t − τ
}
+ ςJ(i,t)t (16)
≡ λEV AJ(i,t)t + ςJ(i,t)t.
We assume that the error ςJ(i,t)t has mean zero when we condition on the firm’s value added
per worker in all periods and the characteristics of workers observed working at the firm
continuously between an initial period t = 1 and a later period t = T (i.e., a “stayer”). Using
equation (4) we can therefore write:
E
[
wiT − wi1|V AJ(i,1)1, V AJ(i,1)T , Xi1, XiT , G (i) , Stayer
]
(17)
= (XiT −Xi1)′ βG(i) + θG(i)[EV AJ(i,1)T − EV AJ(i,1)1],
where θg = γgλ.25 Estimating this equation by OLS separately by gender yields estimates
of the slope parameters θM and θF which can be used to form a third estimate of the
relative bargaining power ratio γF/γM . Note that this estimate is based on within-firm
variation in wages and profitability, while the previous estimates are all based on between-
firm comparisons. Similarity of the various estimates of the relative bargaining power ratio
therefore provides support for the simple rent sharing model specified by equations (1)-(3).
A problem with OLS estimation of (17) is that annual value added per worker data is
extremely noisy. To deal with this problem we also implement an IV strategy that uses the
change in excess value added between years 2 and T − 1 as an instrument for the change
between years 1 and T . This is an imperfect solution both because we are considering a non-
linear function of value added and because measurement errors might be serially correlated.
An alternate solution relies on the insight that according to our model:




E [wiT − wi1|J (i, 1) = j,XiT −Xi1, G (i) = M,Stayer] .
25For simplicity we denote the conditioning event that worker i is continuously employed at the same firm
throughout the sample period by the symbol Stayer.
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That is, the covariate-adjusted average wage changes of male and female stayers at the same
firm should be deterministically related by the gender bargaining power ratio. While the
small number of stayers at each firm makes OLS estimation based upon this relationship
between firm means infeasible, a straightforward instrumental variables solution is available.
For each gender, we regress the change in wages on covariates and firm dummies to obtain
adjusted average firm wage changes by gender. We then regress the adjusted average change
in male wages at each firm on the corresponding average female change using the change
in excess value added between period 1 and T as an instrument and weighting by the total
number of stayers at each firm. This yields a final (and arguably most robust) estimate of
the bargaining power ratio γF/γM .
4 Descriptive Evidence on Firm-Specific Pay Premi-
ums
Although the two-way effects model specified in equation (4) has been widely used over the
past decade, the simple additive structure of the model and the restrictive assumptions needed
for OLS estimation have been strongly criticized by some authors (e.g., Lopes de Melo, 2009;
Eeckhout and Kirchner, 2011). It is therefore useful to scrutinize the model empirically and
verify that the assumptions needed for OLS estimation are at least approximately satisfied.
Following Card, Heining, and Kline (2013), we present simple non-parametric evidence
on the wage changes of people who move between jobs with higher- and lower-paid co-
workers. We document five basic facts that are all consistent with equation (4) and the
related exogenous mobility condition (5). First, men and women who move between jobs with
higher- and lower-paid co-workers experience systematic wage gains and losses, confirming
that there are significant firm-specific pay premiums for both genders. Second, there is no
indication that movers to firms with higher- or lower-paid coworkers experience differential
wage trends prior to their move. Third, wage changes for people who move between firms with
similarly-paid co-workers experience little or no excess wage growth relative to job stayers.
Fourth, the gains and losses from moving between jobs with higher-paid and lower-paid co-
workers are approximately symmetric, suggesting that the firm-specific pay premiums are
additively separable (in logarithms) from other pay components and that mobility patterns
are not driven by comparative advantage in wages. Fifth, women gain less than men from
moving to jobs with more highly paid co-workers, as predicted by a rent sharing model in
which women get a smaller share of the rents than men.
We begin by selecting men and women from the overall analysis sample described in
columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 who are employed at firms with at least one worker of each
gender at some point in our sample period.26 We construct mean log co-worker wages for
each person in each year and divide all jobs for both men and women into four quartiles of
co-worker wages, excluding the small number of workers at firms with only one employee.
Then we identify job changers who are observed for at least two years at their origin firm
26This sample contains 7.78 million person-year observations for men (86% of the overall sample) and 6.30
million person year observations for women (87% of the original sample. In this sample the mean log wages
of men and women are 1.646 and 1.440, respectively, and the gender wage gap is 0.21.
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and two years at their destination firm.27 Finally, we construct average wages in the years
before and after a move for male and female job-changers, classified into 16 cells based on
the co-worker wage quartiles of their origin and destination jobs.
Figures 2a and 2b plot the wage profiles before and after the job change for men and
women who moved from jobs in the lowest (1st) quartile of co-worker wages, and for those
who moved from jobs in the highest (4th) quartile. The figures show that men and women who
move from jobs with highly paid co-workers to jobs with poorly-paid co-workers experience
large average wage losses, while those who move in the opposite direction experience large
wage gains. Moving within a quartile group, by comparison, is associated with relatively
small wage changes. Moreover, although the levels of wages on the old job differ between
people from the same origin quartile who move to different destination quartiles, the trends
prior to moving are very similar across groups. Likewise, wage trends on the new job are
very similar across groups. These observations imply that inter-firm mobility is correlated
with the permanent component of individual wages (i.e., the αi component of equation 4)
but not with the transitory error components (i.e., φjt or εit).
Table 2 summarizes all 16 groups of men and women, including information on the num-
bers of observations in each origin/destination group, the fractions of each origin group that
move to each of the four possible destination groups, and the average wage change expe-
rienced by each group from two years before to two years after the move. Since the job
changers in different origin and destination groups are heterogeneous in terms of age and
education, we also construct an adjusted wage change, using the coefficients from a model
of wage changes fit to the sample of job stayers who remain on the same job over a given
four-year interval. We fit separate models for men and women, including year effects for the
beginning year of the interval, dummies for education, and interactions of education dum-
mies with age and age-squared. We use the coefficients from these regressions to calculate
predicted wage changes for movers. The deviation of each mover’s actual wage change from
his or her predicted change is then averaged over each origin-destination group.
The average adjusted wage changes of the large groups of men and women who move to
new jobs but stay in the same co-worker wage quartile are all relatively small – e.g., 0.1%
for male movers from quartile 1 jobs to other quartile 1 jobs, and -1.7% for female movers
from quartile 2 jobs to other quartile 2 jobs – suggesting that mobility per se has little effect
on wages. The only exception is for movers who stay in quartile 4. Male movers in this
group experience a modest 5.3 percent wage gain (or 1.8% per year) faster wage growth than
stayers, while women in this group experience a 6.1% wage gain (2% per year).
Mobility between co-worker pay quartiles, on the other hand, has large effects on indi-
vidual wages, even controlling for experience. Moreover, while not precisely symmetric, the
mean wage changes for people who move in opposite directions between quartile groups (e.g,
from quartile 1 to quartile 2, versus from quartile 2 to quartile 1) are of similar magnitude and
uniformly of opposite sign. This approximate symmetry is illustrated in Appendix Figures
A1 and A2, where we graph the mean adjusted wage changes for all 16 origin-destination
groups. Examination of these figures suggests that the symmetry restriction implied by the
“no comparative advantage in firm-specific wages” assumptions is approximately satisfied for
both men and women.28
27This restriction means that new jobs are observed starting between 2004 and 2008.
28Since we only observe job status at a single point in time each year we cannot tell when the previous
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Comparisons between the wage changes for men and women in Table 2 point to another
important fact, which is that the changes for female movers tend to be smaller in absolute
value than the corresponding changes for men. This is illustrated in Figure 3, where we
plot the adjusted wage changes for each of the 16 origin-destination quartiles for women
against the corresponding adjusted changes for men. The points lie tightly clustered around
a line with a slope of approximately 0.8, confirming that women gain less from moving to
jobs with more highly paid co-workers, and lose less from moving in the opposite direction.
According to equation (4), the expected wage change for men who move from firm j to firm
k is ψMk − ψMj (ignoring any impact of the X ′s), while the expected wage change for women
is ψFk − ψFj = (γF/γM)(ψMk − ψMj ) (making use of equation 10). Thus, the scatter in Figure
3 points to a relative bargaining power ratio for women of just under 80%.
A potential concern with these simple comparisons is that even within co-worker quartile
groups, males and females are not equally distributed across origin and destination firms. We
therefore matched all female movers in the sample underlying Table 2 to male movers who
made exactly the same firm-to-firm transition. Out of the 98,000 female job movers in Table
2 we were able to match about 8,200 ( 8.3%) to at least one male making the same transition.
We then regressed the mean wage change for female movers on the mean wage change for
men making the same transition, instrumenting the male wage change with the change in
their male co-workers’ wages between the origin and destination firms. (Using wages of
male co-workers as an instrumental variable ensures that the wages of the female movers
are not included in the co-worker wages of the male movers).29 The resulting coefficient
estimate is 0.76, with a standard error of 0.03, providing a very similar estimate of the relative
bargaining power of women. Given the highly selective nature of the matched female/male
mover subsample, however, this estimate must be interpreted cautiously.
To summarize, our analysis thus far provides suggestive nonparametric evidence that firm
wage effects are present and that firm mobility is (at least over the horizon we study) related
to time invariant person components of wages but not to time varying or match components
of wages. Furthermore, mobility between the same sets of firms influences the wages of men
proportionally more than the wages of women, which is a qualitative sign that men possess
greater average bargaining power than women.
5 Estimation of Worker-Firm Models
5.1 Estimation Sample
We turn now to a more systematic analysis of gender differences in pay premiums across
firms. Building directly on equation (4), we fit models that include person effects, gender-
specific firm effects, and a set of time-varying observable covariates with gender-specific
job ended, or why. We suspect that many of the transitions to higher-quartile firms are worker-initiated
voluntary moves, while many of the transitions to lower-quartile firms arise from layoff and firing events.
In any case, the approximate symmetry of the average wage changes for upward and downward transitions
implies that the average match component in firm-specific wages is not systematically different for voluntary
joiners and involuntary leavers, which is consistent with the assumptions needed for OLS estimation of (4).
29The IV model is estimated on a subsample of 6,912 observations in which there are observed wages for
male coworkers at the origin and destination firm.
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coefficients. As noted earlier, the worker and firm effects for each gender group are only
separately identified within a connected set of firms. For simplicity, we restrict our analysis
to the largest connected set of firms for each gender. This allows us to identify the worker and
firm effects for each gender, subject to a single normalization for each group. For estimation
purposes we normalize the firm effects relative the largest firm in the sample. We then
re-normalize the estimated effects as described below.
The estimation samples are described in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1. Overall, 91% of all
person-year observations for male workers and 88% of all person-year observations for female
workers are included in the largest connected sets. The included workers have demographic
characteristics and labor market outcomes very similar to those in our overall analysis sample.
In particular, the mean gender wage gap is only 1 point wider (0.19 versus 0.18) for men
and women in the largest connected sets than in our overall analysis sample. In much of our
analysis below we further limit attention to workers who are employed at firms that are in
the connected sets for both men and women. This “doubly connected” sample – described in
columns 5 and 6 of Table 1 – includes 66% of the person-years of male workers in our analysis
sample, and 69% of the person-years of female workers. Individuals in the doubly connected
set have higher education than in the workforce as a whole, and also have somewhat higher
average wages. The gender wage gap is also larger in this sample than in our overall sample
(23% versus 18%) reflecting the omission of the single-gender firms, which as noted earlier
have a relatively small gender gap.
5.2 Estimation Results
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 summarize the parameter estimates and fit of our models for
men and women in the samples described in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 (i.e., the largest
connected sets of workers of each gender). The models include fixed effects for workers and
firms (a total of 2.1 million dummies for men and 1.7 million dummies for women) as well as
year dummies, fully interacted with education dummies (for the 4 education groups shown
in Table 2) and quadratic and cubic terms in age interacted with education dummies.30






for each observation, as well as the correlation of the person and firm effects,
the residual standard deviation of the model, and the adjusted R-squared statistics. For both
males and females, the standard deviations of the person effects are nearly twice as big as
the standard deviations of the firm effects, implying that a relatively large share of wage
inequality for both genders is attributed to worker characteristics that are equally rewarded
at all firms. The correlations between the estimated person and firm effects are both positive,
implying that more highly-skilled men and women are disproportionately employed at firms
that pay all their workers a bigger wage premium. Such positive assortative matching has
been found in many recent studies of wage determination.31
30Estimates were computed using a preconditioned conjugate gradient algorithm as in Card, Heining, and
Kline (2013).
31See e.g., Card, Heining and Kline (2013) for West Germany, Mare and Hyslop (2006) for New Zealand,
Skans et al. (2008) for Sweden, and Bagger et al. (2012) for Denmark. The sampling errors in the estimated
person and firm effects from a model such as (4) are in general negatively correlated (see e.g., Mare and Hyslop,
2006; Andrews et al., 2008), implying that the correlations between the estimated effects are downward biased
18
The middle panel of Table 3 shows fit statistics for a generalized model of wage determi-
nation that includes unrestricted dummies for each job match. This model provides a slightly
better fit to the wage data for both men and women, with adjusted R-squared statistics that
are about 1 percentage point higher (e.g., 0.951 versus 0.940 for women). Comparing the
residual standard error of the job match model to the corresponding standard error for the
model with worker and firm effects we can construct an estimate of the standard deviation of
the permanent job match effects (the miJ(i,t)) that are absorbed in the job match model but
included in the residual of (4). The estimates are 0.062 for men and 0.054 for women – only
about one-quarter as big as the standard deviations of the firm effects for the two genders.
We conclude that the firm-wide component of job match surplus is considerably larger than
the purely idiosyncratic component.
We have also conducted a series of additional specification checks of the fit of our basic
models. In one check, we examine the mean residuals from equation (4) for subgroups of
observations classified by the decile of the estimated person effect and the decile of the
estimated firm effect. As shown in Appendix Figures A3 and A4, we find that the mean
residuals are very small in all 100 cells for both genders, suggesting that the additive structure
of (4) provides a good approximation to the wage-setting process in Portugal. In a second
check, we examined the mean residuals for workers who transition between groups of firms,
classified by the quartile of the (gender-specific) estimated firm effects. We find that the
mean residuals are small in magnitude for groups of men and women who move up or down
the firm quality distribution.
The bottom rows of Table 3 present the main components of a simple decomposition of
the variance of wages across workers implied by the fitted version of equation (4):




























Among both male and female workers, person effects accounts for about 60% of overall wage
variation, firm effects account for about 20%, and the covariation in worker and firm effects
accounts for an additional 10%. In both cases the contribution of the measured covariates
(including the main effects and the covariances with the person and firm effects) is relatively
small, and the residual component is also small, reflecting the relatively high R-squared
coefficients for the underlying models.
5.3 Normalizing the Estimated Firm Effects
As noted in Section 3.2, we normalize the firm effects relative to a set of firms that arguably
offer no surplus to workers of either gender. Figure 4 shows the relationship between our
estimated male and female firm effects (normalized for purposes of estimation by setting the
effects to zero for the largest firm in the sample) and average log value added per worker.
We group firms into percentile bins of value added and plot the mean estimated firm effects
for men and women at the firms in each bin against average log value added per worker for
estimates of the degree of assortative matching.
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firms in the bin.32
A striking feature of this figure is the piecewise linear nature of the relationship with value
added. Firms in the bottom percentile groups pay very similar average wages, while at higher
percentiles the firm-specific wage premiums for both men and women are linearly increasing
in log value added per worker, suggesting a constant elasticity relationship between wages
and value added above a value added “kinkpoint.” To identify the value added threshold














0, V AJ(i,t) − τ
}
+ νFJ(i,t).
where (as above) V Aj represents the average of log value added per worker at firm j, and
τ is a threshold beyond which the firm begins to share rents. We estimated these equations
for a range of values of τ using data on all firms in the dual connected sample that can be
matched to the financial data set.33 We then selected the value of τ that minimized the mean
squared error of the system of two equations. Consistent with the pattern of the points in
Figure 4, this procedure selects a value of τˆ = 2.45: the estimated values of the coefficients
piM and piF are 0.156 and 0.137, respectively.34 We show the fitted relationship with blue
and pink lines in the figure.
The implied set of “no rent” firms (i.e., those with V Aj < τˆ) account for 9.4% of all
person-years at dual-connected firms in our sample with financial information (6.6% of male
person-years and 12.9% of female person-years). Workers at these firms have relatively low
education and receive relatively low wages (42% below average among men, and 28% below
average among women). Given the estimate τˆ we then determine the values of normalizing
constants such that the re-normalized effects for both genders have employment-weighted
averages of zero across all firms with V Aj < τˆ .
35 To check the sensitivity of our normalization
procedures, we used a nonparametric bootstrap procedure to estimate the standard error of
the estimate of τ . The resulting estimated standard error is 0.09, implying a 95% confidence
interval of [2.27, 2.63]. We then re-calculated the normalizing constants using the upper and
lower values of this confidence interval. We obtained constants that are quite close to the
baseline constants for τˆ = 2.45, suggesting that our procedure is relatively insensitive to
sampling errors in τˆ .
Figure 5 graphs the normalized firm effects for women against the corresponding effects for
men, using the same 100 groups as in Figure 4. There is clearly a strong relationship between
the average premiums paid to male workers in each group and the average premiums for
female workers. In fact, even at the individual firm level the employment-weighted correlation
32We define the groups so they have equal numbers of person-year observations, using the sample of men
and women at dual-connected firms with merged financial data.
33We fit the model to firm-level data using the 47,477 dual connected firms with matched financial data.
These firms account for 6.95 million person-year observations in our data set, or 63% of the person-year
observations at dual-connected firms.
34Appendix Figure A5 shows the adjusted R-squared from the bivariate system for a range of values of τ
and the associated estimates of the coefficients piM , piF .





j , respectively. The difference arises because we choose the normalizing constants based on the
employment-weighted average of the firm effects for all firms with V Aj < τˆ .
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of ψˆFj and ψˆ
M
j is 0.59 across firms in the dual-connected set, and the corresponding regression
of ψˆFj on ψˆ
M
j has a slope of 0.56. Given the presence of sampling errors in the estimated
firm effects, however, this is a downward-biased estimate of the rent-sharing ratio γF/γM .
Grouping firms by values of V Aj averages out the sampling errors and yields an estimated
slope coefficient of 0.89, implying that women have about 10% less bargaining strength than
men.
6 Firm-specific Pay Premiums and the Gender Wage
Gap
6.1 Decompositions Based on Estimated Firm Effects
Given the normalized firm effects for men and women we can quantify the impact of firm-
specific pay premiums on the gender wage gap, and use equations (8) and (9) to decompose
the total effect into components due to sorting and relative bargaining power. We begin
in Table 4a by showing the various terms in these equations. Row 1 shows the mean log
wages of men and women in the dual connected sample and the mean gender wage gap,
which is 23.4%. Row 2 shows the means of the estimated firm effects for men across male
person-year observations (column 1) and across female person-year observations (column 2),
and the difference between these means (column 3). Similarly, row 3 shows the means of
the estimated female firm effects among male and female person-year observations, and the
difference. Our estimate of E[ψMj |G (i) = M ] – the average rents received by male workers
– is simply the mean of the estimated male firm effects among males, which evaluates to
14.8%. Our estimate of E[ψFJ(i,t)|G (i) = F ] – the average rents received by female workers
– is the mean of the estimated female firm effects among females, which evaluates to 9.9%.
Thus, our estimate of the total contribution of firm-specific pay policies to the gender wage
gap is 14.8% - 9.9% = 4.9%, which is displayed in row 5, column 3.
The part of this total attributable to the bargaining channel can be calculated in either of
two ways. One is to compute the average difference between the male and female firm effects
for each firm, weighted by the shares of men at each firm (i.e., E[ψMJ(i,t) − ψFJ(i,t)|G (i) = M ])
– this is the difference shown in row 4, column 1, and is equal to 0.3%. The alternative is
to compute the average difference between the male and female firm effects for each firm,
weighted by the shares of women at each firm (i.e., E[ψMJ(i,t) − ψFJ(i,t)|G (i) = F ]). This
difference, shown in row 4 of column 2, is equal to 1.5%. We therefore estimate that the
bargaining channel explains a 0.3 to 1.5 percent gap in male-female wages, 1.2 to 6.3 percent
of the overall gender wage gap.
Similarly, the impact of the sorting channel can be calculated in two ways. The first is
to compute E[ψMJ(i,t)|G (i) = M ] − E[ψMJ(i,t)|G (i) = F ]. As shown in column 3, row 2, this
implies a 3.5% effect. The second is to compute E[ψFJ(i,t)|G (i) = M ] − E[ψFJ(i,t)|G (i) = F ].
As shown in column 3, row 3, this is 4.7%. Thus, the sorting channel explains 14.9 to 19.9
percent of the overall male-female wage gap.
The results in Table 4a point to several interesting conclusions. Relative to the least
productive firms in the labor market, men earn about a 15% average wage premium while
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women earn a 10% premium. The 5 percentage point gap accounts for a little over one-fifth
of the gender wage gap at mixed-gender firms. Three quarters or more of this overall effect is
explained by the relative concentration of women to firms that offer lower wages to both men
and women. This finding agrees with the results of Cardoso, Guimara˜es and Portugal (2012),
who conclude that roughly a fifth of the gender wage gap in Portugal is attributable to the
differential sorting of women across firms.36 The estimated impact of differential bargaining
power is smaller, and explains at most 1.5 points of the 23.4 point gender gap. While modest,
this 1.5 point effect is consistent with the prediction following from equation (11), given an
estimate of the rent-sharing ratio γF/γM equal to 0.9 and an estimate of the mean rents of
male workers of roughly 15%.
Table 4b present a similar analysis for different age and education subgroups. Column
1 of the table shows the mean log wage gap between men and women for the subsample
indicated by the row heading (e.g., 23.4% for the overall sample in row 1). Column 2 shows
the mean value of the (normalized) male firm effects for men in the dual connected sample,
which is our estimate of the rents earned by men – while column 3 shows the mean value of
the (normalized) female firm effects for women, which is our estimate of the rents earned by
women. The gap between these two (column 4) is our estimate of the total contribution of
firm-specific pay policies to the gender wage gap (e.g., 4.9% for the overall sample). Columns
5-8 present the terms in the alternative decompositions described by equations (8) and (9).
The entry in column 5 is the difference between the average value of the male firm effects
at jobs held by men versus women, and is our estimate of the sorting effect using male firm
effects. The alternative estimate of the sorting effect in column 6 uses female firm effects.
Finally, the entries in columns 7 and 8 show the estimated contributions of relative bargaining
channel, using the distribution of men across firms (column 7) or the distribution of women
across firms (column 8).
Comparing across age groups (rows 2-4) the entries in column 1 show that the male-female
wage gap in Portugal widens dramatically with age, from around 10% for workers under 30 to
33% for workers over the age of 40. Firm-specific pay policies contribute to this age pattern,
rising from 2.8% for workers under the age of 30 to 6.9 percentage points for workers over
40. The rise is mainly due to the sorting effect. The relative bargaining power advantage of
men also rises with age but only by a percentage point or so.
Looking across education groups in the bottom rows of Table 4b, we see that the wage gap
is roughly constant across education groups, but the average rents received by both men and
women are increasing with years of schooling. This pattern implies that some of the “return
to education” in Portugal is attributable to the impact of firm-specific pay policies. Among
men, for example, the average rent component rises from 11.5% to 25.9% between workers
with less than high school education, and those with university education. This 14 point rise
accounts for about one-sixth of the 95 log point wage gap between university educated men
and those with less than high school education in the dual connected sample. Among women
the rent component rises from 5.5% to 21.3%, again enough to account for about one-sixth
of the overall wage gap between university-educated women and those with less than high
school education.
36Cardoso, Guimara˜es and Portugal (2012) estimate a worker-firm model imposing that the firm effects
are identical across the genders. This ignores the relative bargaining power effect.
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As shown in column 4, the net effect of firm-specific pay policies on the gender wage
gap is about the same for workers with less than high school or high school education, but is
somewhat smaller for university-educated workers. The smaller effect for the latter group is a
result of a substantially smaller sorting effect for university educated women, coupled with a
relatively large bargaining power effect. Indeed, the biggest impact of differential bargaining
power between women and men across all the groups in Table 4b is for the university-educated
group.
To summarize, we find evidence of substantial gender differences in firm wage premia,
with most of the differences attributable to workers sorting, but a non-negligible component
attributable to bargaining, particularly among more educated workers. As noted earlier, our
normalization procedure is likely to understate (if mildly) the importance of bargaining effects
by understating the magnitude of rents in the labor market. Therefore, our estimates are
in keeping with recent popular discussion (e.g. Sanberg, 2013) in suggesting the bargaining
factors may be quite important for understanding the success of high skilled women.
6.2 Gender or Occupation?
A well-known feature of labor markets is that women and men work in different occupations
(see e.g. Petersen and Morgan, 1995, Manning and Swaffield, 2008, and Goldin, 2014 for re-
cent analyses, and Cardoso, Guimara˜es and Portugal, 2012 for a discussion in the Portuguese
context). Even within a given firm, the jobs held by men and women are often quite different.
This raises the question of whether some of the differential bargaining power illustrated in
Figure 5 is actually due to differences in the extent to which workers in different occupations
receive different shares of any firm-wide rents.37 To address this question, we fit separate
fixed effect models for male and female workers who work in mainly male or mainly female
occupations, allowing unrestricted firm effects for each group. We then investigated whether
there is a systematic difference in bargaining power between men and women who work in
similar occupations, or if the differences we see in Figure 5 are really due to differences in
bargaining power between occupation groups.
We began by calculating the fraction of female workers in each of the 110 3-digit occupa-
tions identified in the QP data set (based on person-year level data). Appendix Figure A6
shows the histogram of female shares across occupations. There are spikes in the distribution
of female shares at close to 0 (mainly for construction and related occupations), close to 1
(mainly for personal service occupations), and around 60-70% female (for retail sales and
restaurant workers). Next, we assigned the average fraction of female workers in the current
occupation to each worker in each year. Finally, we classified workers as having “mainly
female” or “mainly male” occupations depending on whether the average fraction of female
workers in his or her occupation(s) is above or below average. This procedure classifies 83%
of women and 27% of men as having mainly female occupations, and a complementary 17%
of women and 73% of men as having mainly male occupations.
Columns 7-10 of Table 1 display the characteristics of the four resulting groups, limiting
attention to the subsets of each group who are also in the dual connected set. Men with
mainly male occupations tend to be slightly older but are less-educated than men with mainly
37Ransom and Oaxaca (2005) present a case study of occupational segregation within a chain of U.S.
grocery stores that led to substantially lower wages for female employees at the firm.
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female occupations. Despite their lower education, they also earn slightly more (+2%) than
than those in mainly female occupations. In contrast, women in mainly male occupations
have higher education than those in mainly female occupations, and earn substantially more
(+20%) than those in mainly female occupations. Looking within broad occupation groups,
the gender gap in wages is relatively small (8%) for workers with mainly male occupations,
but is relatively large (26%) for workers in mainly female occupations.
The results from estimating equation 4 on the four groups are summarized in columns
3-6 of Table 3. As in our main analysis, we estimate the model on the set of worker and
firm observations in the largest connected set for each group (without limiting attention to
workers at dual-connected firms). The estimated models are similar to the models estimated
for the overall samples of men and women, and yield broadly similar conclusions about the
relative importance of worker and firm effects in the overall variation of wages.
Table 4c summarizes the results of our comparisons between men and women with mainly
female and mainly male occupations. For reference, Row a of the Table reproduces the results
from Table 4a for all men and women at dual connected firms. Row b of the Table conducts
a comparison between men and women with mainly female occupations who work at firms
that employ both groups. As expected given the comparisons in Table 1, the gender wage
gap in this subsample is a little larger than in the overall dual connected set. The total
contribution of firm-specific pay policies to the gender gap (in column 4) is two-thirds as
large as in the overall sample, reflecting a reduction in the sorting component and especially
the relative bargaining power component, which is actually “wrong signed” when evaluated
using the distribution of male workers across firms. These results suggest that women in
mainly female occupations receive about the same firm-specific pay premiums as their male
colleagues in the same occupations. Both groups, however, receive smaller pay premiums than
men in mainly male occupations. Consequently, firm-specific pay policies still contribute to
the gender wage gap.
Row c presents the comparison between men and women with mainly male occupations
who work at firms that employ both groups. Consistent with the patterns noted in our
discussion of Table 1, the gender wage gap in this subsample is relatively small (13.7%).
Nevertheless, a relatively large share (32%) of the gap is attributable to firm-specific pay
policies, with one decomposition (based on equation 8) attributing 20% of the gap to sorting
and 12% to bargaining, and the other (based on equation 9) attributing 11% of the gap to
sorting and 21% to bargaining.
6.3 Firm Effects and Profitability
So far we have focused on the differences in the firm-specific premiums paid to men and
women without distinguishing between the potential sources of these premiums. As is made
clear by equation (13), ψMj and ψ
F
j contain components that are directly related to observable
proxies for firm-specific rents as well as residual components (νMj and ν
F
j ) that are potentially
attributable to other factors. In this section we focus more narrowly on the parts of the firm
effects that are directly related to observable productivity, and ask how these differ between
men and women.
Table 5 summarizes a series of models based on equation (13). Row 1 of the table
presents estimates of the gender specific rent-sharing coefficients piM and piF , as well their
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ratio, estimated across all firms in our dual-connected set with linked financial data. By
construction, the estimates are identical to the estimates obtained from equation (19) at the
optimized value for τˆ . To estimate the sampling error for the estimated ratio, we note that
pˆiF/pˆiM is the two-stage least squares estimate of the parameter δ1 from a simple model of
the form:
ψˆFJ(i,t) = δ0 + δ1ψˆ
M
J(i,t) + eJ(i,t),
using excess value added per worker as an instrumental variable for ψˆMj . We therefore use
the conventional standard error of the two-stage least squares estimator as our estimated
standard error for the ratio. As shown in column 6 of the table, the estimated ratio is 0.88
with a standard error of 0.03. We can therefore rule out the null hypothesis of equal rent
sharing (piF= piM) in favor of the alternative that women receive a smaller share of the
component of firm-wide rents that is directly related to excess value added.
In row 2 we fit a parallel set of models for the estimated firm effects of different employee
groups at firms that are included in the connected set for female workers in female occupa-
tions. As shown in columns 2 and 3, the estimated rent sharing coefficients for all male and
all female employees at these firms are very similar to the coefficients obtained over the full
dual connected set (in row 1), and their ratio is identical to the ratio in row 1. Column 4
presents the coefficient estimate relating the firm effects for women in mainly female occu-
pations to value added at the firm. Interestingly, this is very similar to the coefficient for all
female workers, and is about 88% as large as the corresponding coefficient for men (column
7).
Finally, in row 3 we fit models for the estimated firm effects of different employee groups
at firms that are included in the connected set for female workers in male occupations.
The estimated rent sharing coefficients for all male workers and all female workers at this
subsample of firms are a little smaller than the corresponding coefficients in row 1, and the
ratio of the female to male coefficients is slightly larger (0.92 versus 0.88), but within a
standard error of the ratio for the overall sample. The estimated rent sharing coefficient for
female workers in mainly male occupations (column 5) is nearly the same as the coefficient
for all female workers, and is 93.3% as large as the coefficient for males at these firms (column
8), though given the sampling errors we cannot reject the null that these workers have the
same rent sharing parameter as all male workers.
To probe the robustness of the results in Table 5 we re-estimated the models including
controls for industry (20 dummies), location (dummies for firms located in Lisbon or Oporto)
and a quadratic in firm size (based on average total employment in all years). Estimates from
these models are presented in Appendix Table A3. In brief, the addition of controls leads to
a slight attenuation (on the order of 10-15%) in the estimated rent sharing coefficients, with
a slightly bigger attenuation of the coefficients for women than men. These models therefore
reinforce our conclusion that women get a smaller share of rents than men, though in all
cases the estimated ratios are within a standard error of the ratios in Table 5.
Given estimates of the rent sharing coefficients piF and piM and the means of excess average
value added across jobs, we can estimate
E[piMEV AJ(i,t)|G (i) = M ]− E[piFEV AJ(i,t)|G (i) = F ],
which gives the contribution to the gender wage gap of the component of firm-specific pay
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premiums that is correlated with measured productivity. We can also decompose this con-
tribution into bargaining and sorting channels using equations (14) and (15). In Appendix
Table A4 we present estimates of the terms in these two alternative decompositions, using the
overall sample of dual-connected workers. We find that the productivity-related component
of the male and female firm effects account for 80% of our overall estimates of the size of
the rent premiums received by both men and women, and 80% of the impact of firm-specific
premiums on the gender wage gap. Since excess value added per worker is a noisy measure
of the rents available at a given firm, we suspect that the 80% figure should be interpreted
as a lower bound on the share of productivity-related factors that drive the variation in
firm-specific pay premiums. Applying the decompositions in equations (14) and (15) we find
that differential sorting of men to high productivity firms accounts for about two-thirds of
the total effect of productivity-related factors, while the lower bargaining power of women
accounts for about one-third, or 1-1.5 log points of the overall gender gap.
7 Within Firm Changes in Profitability and Wages
Our analysis so far has focused on the gender-specific firm effects in equation (4) that capture
between-firm differences in the average wages paid to men and women. As noted in Section
3.5, however, a rent-sharing model with differential bargaining power also has implications
for the within-firm evolution of wages of male and female workers as firms experience changes
in product market conditions, technology, or other factors over time. In this section we use
observations from the last 4 years of our analysis sample (2006-2009) to measure the effects of
changes in firm-specific profitability on the wages of male and female job stayers. In addition
to exploiting a different source of variation, this analysis has the advantage of not relying on
the exogenous mobility assumptions underlying the worker-firm decomposition of wages.
We begin in Table 6 with an overview of the subsamples of workers from our dual con-
nected sample who are observed working at the same firm between 2006 and 2009, and whose
employer has financial information available for each year from SABI. We focus on three spe-
cific subsamples: all workers that meet these criteria (columns 1-2); workers at firms that
have some female stayers with mainly female occupations (columns 3-4); and workers at
firms with some female stayers with mainly male occupations (columns 5-6). We show mean
age and education of the men and women in each subsample, mean firm size and the mean
fraction of female workers, mean log wages in 2006 and 2009, and the mean value of excess
value added per worker (as defined in equation 16) for employers in 2006 and 2009
The overall sample of stayers in columns 1-2 contains 280,000 men and 200,000 women
employed at 33,000 firms. The men and women in this sample have about the same age,
education and wages as men and women in our overall analysis sample. The gender wage
gap in the sample of stayers is also very close to the gap in our dual connected sample,
with a value of 22 log points in both 2006 and 2009. Real wages of both male and female
stayers rise by 8 log points over the 3 year period, while excess real value added per worker is
stable. The subsample of stayers at firms with at least one female worker in a mainly female
occupation (columns 3-4) includes workers at 29,000 firms (87% of the firms included in the
overall stayer sample). Over 90% of the men in the overall sample of stayers are included in
this subsample so the characteristics of the males in column 3 are quite similar to those in
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column 1. Most of the female workers at these firms are in mainly female occupations, and for
simplicity we show only the characteristics of these women in column 4, which are again quite
similar to the characteristics of the overall sample of female stayers. The subset of stayers at
firms with at least one female in a mainly male occupation (columns 5-6) is more selective,
and includes only about one-third of firms, though together these firms account for about
two-thirds of all male stayers. These firms have somewhat higher excess log value added per
worker (e.g., 0.84 vs. 0.76 in 2006) and their male employees have somewhat higher wages
(e.g., about 4% higher in 2006) than in the overall sample of male stayers. Female stayers
with mainly male occupations have higher wages than other female workers but their wage
growth is comparable to other female stayers.
Figure 7 illustrates the relationship between the changes in excess value added between
2006 and 2009 and the corresponding changes in wages of male and female job stayers, using
our broadest sample of stayers. To reduce the impact of measurement errors in the change in
value added we group firms into 20 roughly equally sized groups based on the change in excess
log value added per worker, and construct the mean log wage changes of the job stayers for
each group. As shown in the graph, mean wage changes are strongly correlated with changes
in excess value added (the correlation is 0.68 for both men and women). Moreover, the
relationship is noticeably flatter for women, suggesting a smaller degree of rent sharing for
female employees than males.38
Table 7 presents a series of models based on equation (17) which show the relationship
between the change in excess value added at a firm and the wage changes of male and female
stayers. As discussed in Section 3.5, we estimate these models in two steps, first regressing
wage changes over the 2006-2009 period on a quadratic in age (separately by gender), then
in a second stage regressing the average regression-adjusted wage changes at each firm on
the change in excess value added at the firm, weighting by the number of workers at the firm
in the gender group. Given the large variability in measured value added, we “Winsorize”
the change in excess value added at +/- 0.50. (A parallel set of models, estimated without
Winsorizing, is presented in Appendix Table A5). Columns 1 and 3 of the table show the
resulting OLS estimates for all male stayers and all female stayers. For the overall sample of
stayers (row 1) these estimates are 0.049 and 0.045, respectively. A concern with these OLS
estimates is attenuation bias, caused by measurement error in the change in excess value
added per worker. Assuming the measurement error uncorrelated with other firm-specific
determinants of wage changes, however, any attenuation bias will affect the male and female
coefficients proportionately, so their ratio is an unbiased estimate of the relative bargaining
power ratio. We show this ratio in column 5. Consistent with the pattern in Figure 5, and the
estimates in Table 5, the ratio is 0.90, though the standard error of the estimate is relatively
large.39
While the OLS estimates can be used to infer the relative bargaining power of female
workers, the magnitudes of the rent sharing coefficients are also of interest, so we show
38A regression of the change in wages of stayers on the change in excess value added has a coefficient of
0.071 for men (standard error 0.014) and a coefficient of 0.044 (standard error 0.01) for women, excluding
the top and bottom bins.
39We estimate this standard error from an IV regression of the firm-specific average wage change for female
stayers on the corresponding average wage change for male stayers, using the change in excess value added
per worker over the period 2006-2009 as an instrument.
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IV estimates of these coefficients, using the Winsorized change in excess value added per
worker from 2007 to 2008 as an instrument for the change from 2006 to 2009. Under the
(strong) assumption that the measurement error in excess value added in each year is serially
uncorrelated, this procedure will provide consistent estimates of the rent sharing coefficients.
More realistically, with some serial correlation in the measurement errors this procedure will
yield estimates that are still biased toward zero, but less so than the OLS estimates. As
shown by the first-stage F-statistics reported in columns 2 and 4, the change in excess value
added from 2007 to 2008 is a powerful predictor of the change over the longer horizon, with F-
statistics of around 240 (clustered by firm). The resulting IV estimates, presented in columns
2 and 4, yield a rent-sharing elasticity for men of 0.092 and for women of 0.091.
Compared to the rent sharing coefficients from the between-firm analysis in row 1 of
Table 5, even the IV estimates of the rent sharing effects for stayers are noticeably smaller.
For example, the estimated between-firm rent sharing coefficient for men is 0.156 while the
estimated within-firm coefficient is 0.092. There are three plausible explanations for the
discrepancy. First, we suspect that our IV procedure provides an incomplete solution to the
problem of measurement error in the within-firm estimates. Second, contrary to equation (1),
it may be that wages are less responsive to transitory fluctuations in rents than to permanent
differences.40 Finally, institutional features like multi-year collective bargaining contracts and
lags in the individual negotiation process may slow the adjustment of wages to movements
in profitability.
In row 2 of Table 7 we present models for the subset of workers employed at firms with
some females in mainly female occupations. The estimates for all male and female workers at
these firms (columns 1-5) are very similar to the estimates for the overall sample of stayers.
The estimates for females in mainly female occupations (columns 6-8) are also very similar
to those for all females at these firms, and show a relative bargaining power ratio for these
women of about 0.9. Finally, in row 3 we present models for the workers employed at firms
with some females in mainly male occupations. Again, the estimates for all males and females
at these firms are close to the estimates for the overall sample in row 1. For women in mainly
male occupations the estimated coefficients are also relatively close to the estimates for other
groups of women. The estimate of their relative bargaining power (column 11) is actually
larger than 1, but is quite imprecise.
Overall the estimates in Table 7, while limited by the relatively short sample period over
which we can observe job stayers, are supportive of the hypothesis that female workers gain
less than their male co-workers when their employer becomes more profitable. Indeed, our
estimate of the ratio γF/γM is centered around 0.9 for all women and women in mainly
female occupations, quite close to the estimated ratio from our previous designs.
We have estimated a variety of additional models for other subgroups of male and female
stayers, including workers in larger and smaller firms, workers in firms with larger and smaller
fractions of female employees, and workers in firms with higher and lower within-firm wage
inequality. Unfortunately, as suggested by the standard errors for the estimated ratios in Ta-
ble 7, our ability to precisely estimate the relative bargaining power of women is limited, and
none of the estimates of the relative ratio of female to male bargaining power are significantly
40Guiso et al. (2005) analyse the relationship between wages and firm profitability using Social Security
earnings record for Italian workers, and find smaller impacts of short run changes of profitability than of
longer-run changes.
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different from 0.9 – the average ratio across firms.
8 Summary and Conclusions
A growing body of research argues that firm-specific wage premiums are a pervasive and
economically important feature of labor market earnings. These premiums will contribute to
the gender wage gap if women tend to work at firms that offer smaller premiums, or if female
employees tend to earn smaller premiums than their male colleagues at higher-paying firms.
Previous literature suggests that both channels may be at work in modern labor markets.
On one hand, there is evidence that women gain less from inter-firm mobility than men (e.g.,
Loprest 1992, Hospido 2009, Del Bono and Vuri, 2011). On the other, a variety of lab-
and field-based studies suggest that women are less likely to initiate bargaining with their
employers than men, and gain less when they do bargain (see Bertrand, 2011 for a recent
survey).
We have developed a simple way of jointly assessing both the sorting and bargaining
mechanisms using matched employer-employee data that includes wage outcomes for workers
at different employers and firm-level financial information. In essence, our approach is to
estimate the full set of firm-specific wage premiums earned by men and women, then conduct
a standard decomposition exercise that evaluates the effect on the gender wage gap if women
received the same premiums as men at each firm (or vice versa), and alternatively if women
had the same distribution across firms as men (or vice versa). This framework provides a
comprehensive summary of the potential role of firm-specific pay policies in mediating the
gender wage gap.
Our approach builds on the simple two-way fixed effects model of Abowd, Kramarz, and
Margolis (1999), extended to allow for gender-specific firm effects. We show that the identi-
fying assumptions required for OLS estimates of this model to recover meaningful parameter
estimates are approximately satisfied in the Portuguese labor market. We also show that the
wage premiums paid to men and women at a given firm are highly correlated with each other,
and with a simple measure of firm-specific productivity based on value-added per worker.
On average, we find that female employees receive about 90% of the wage premiums that
men earn at more profitable firms. We also find that women are disproportionately likely
to work at firms that pay lower premiums for both genders. Overall, we conclude that the
sorting and bargaining channels explain about 20% of the gender wage gap in Portugal.
Roughly two-thirds of this 20% is explained by sorting and one-third by the shortfall in
relative bargaining. As a secondary check on the relative bargaining channel, we examine
the impacts of changes in firm-specific productivity on changes in the wages of males and
females who remain with the firm over time. Again, we find that women receive about 90%
of the wage increases enjoyed by their male co-workers.
An important question for future research is the extent to which differences in the average
wage premiums paid to men and women by the same firm are due to differences in the
behavior of female employees, versus differences in how employers interact with their female
workers. While some of the difference may be due to a preference among women to avoid
bargaining (e.g., the “nice girls don’t ask” hypothesis of Babcock and Laschever, 2003), an
alternative explanation is that employers treat women differently in the wage setting process.
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Such differential behavior is actually implied by monopsonist wage setting models in which
firms set wages taking account of the elasticity of supply of men and women to the firm (see
Manning, 2003 and Barth and Dale-Olsen, 2009). It seems plausible that the treatment of
women in the wage-setting process would vary substantially from firm to firm, which may
explain the emphasis in the U.S. on crafting legislation prohibiting unequal treatment within
a firm by gender or race.
Another open question is how to explain the under-representation of women at high-wage
firms. Evidence from the de-regulation of the U.S. banking sector (Ashenfelter and Hannan,
1986; Black and Strahan, 2001) suggests that firms with greater market power exercise greater
discrimination against women. To the extent this is the case, policies aimed at discrimination
in hiring and firing may play an important role in mitigating some of the gender wage gap.
On the supply side, men and women may place different values on non-wage aspects of a job
(like proximity to home), leading to differential sorting on the wage component. Our analysis
shows that the degree of differential sorting rises with age, contributing to the systematic
life cycle pattern in the gender wage gap. More research on the dynamic patterns of sorting
with comprehensive worker and firm data could further illuminate this channel.
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a. Quadros de Pessoal
The Quadros de Pessoal (QP) dataset for 2002-2009 includes over 20 million observations
on 4.5 million workers. Individuals are identified over time with a unique person identifier.
Firms are identified by a unique firm id. To construct our analysis sample we drop the
entire history for a person if: (1) the hiring date for any job is missing or inconsistent
across observations (0.6% of observations dropped); (2) the individual is observed in two
consecutive years at different firms, but the hiring date for the second job is the same as
the hiring date for the first job (6.9% of observations dropped); the hourly wage in any year
is too high or too low (0.3% dropped); the change in the log hourly wage from one year to
the next is less than −1 or greater than 1 (1.6% dropped). After these deletions we retain
only person-year observations in which the worker is between the ages of 19 to 65 (1.6%
of observations dropped), with at least two years of potential labor market experience (i.e.,
age − education − 6 ≥ 2) (0.7% dropped) and is employed as a wage-earner (droppping
9.3% of observations). Appendix Table A1 shows the characteristics of the male and female
observations in the entire QP, and our analysis sample. Overall the samples are quite similar
in terms of age, education, location, mean hourly wage, and mean monthly hours of work.
b. SABI
Bureau van Dijk’s SABI data base has annual data for non-financial firms including:
a firm tax identifier; balance sheet information (with sales and the value of intermediate
inputs); total employment; the firm’s name, address, industry, shareholder capital; and date
of formation. Data are available from 2000 onward, but coverage expanded substantially in
2005, and information on employment is missing for many firms prior to 2006.
c. Matching QP and SABI
The following variables are common to QP and SABI and can be used to match observa-
tions for a given firm in a given year in the two data sets: (1) location – zip code and county
(concelho) in SABI, parish (freguesia) and county in QP; (2) 5 digit industry; (3) year of
firm creation; (4) shareholder capital; (5) annual sales. We do not use employment in our
matching procedure, but we use it as a check variable.
In QP, total sales in a given year are reported for the previous calendar year. We therefore
use sales in year t− 1 to match observations in year t. In SABI, both sales and shareholder
capital are reported in thousands of euro, whereas in QP they are reported in euros. We
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therefore round both variables in QP to the thousands. Sales and shareholder capital are
treated as missing if the reported values are zero. The zip codes reported in SABI were
converted to parishes, with the exception of a few codes that cross parish boundaries and a
few that appear to be non-existent codes.
We use a multi-step matching procedure which uses exact matching at each stage, and
sequentially relaxes the number of variables that have to match exactly. Firms that are
matched at one step are removed from both data sets, leaving unmatched observations for
the next step. The steps are as follows:
1. Exact matching based on 5 variables: location, industry, year of firm creation, sales
and shareholder capital. We first attempt an exact match using sales and shareholder capital
for 2009 (the other variables are time-invariant), then work backwards to 2005. We initially
use parish and 5-digit industry to look for exact matches. We then repeat the process using
county and 3-digit industry.
2. Exact matching based on 4 variables: location, industry, and any two of: year of firm
creation, annual sales, or shareholder capital. As in step 1, we initially use parish and 5-digit
industry to look for exact matches, then use county and 3-digit industry.
3. Exact matching based on 3 variables: location, industry, and any one of: year of firm
creation, annual sales, or shareholder capital. As in step 1, we initially use parish and 5-digit
industry to look for exact matches, then use county and 3-digit industry. In this step, once a
potential match was found, we compared data from QP and SABI to check the plausibility of
the match. Specifically, we checked annual observations on sales and shareholder capital for
2005-2009. A match was validated only if the deviation between SABI and QP did not exceed
1% in any year for either sales or shareholder capital, or, in cases with a larger deviation in
any one year, if the values in all other years were exactly the same in both data sets.
4. Exact matching based on 2 variables: location and any one of industry, year of firm
creation, annual sales, or shareholder capital. As in step 3, potential matches were compared
and only retained if the same criterion was met.
We matched a total of 301,417 firms between QP and SABI - representing about 80% of
the firms that ever appear in SABI, and 53% of firms that appear at least once (with a worker
in our analysis sample) in QP from 2002 to 2009. Of the matches, 52% were matched on all
five variables, 31% were matched on four variables,12% were matched on three variables, and
the remainder were matched on two varables. The match rate by firm size (based on average
number of employees in QP) are as follows: 1-10 workers - 50.7%; 11-50 workers - 68.61%,
51-100 workers - 67.0%, 101-500 workers - 69.2%, over 500 workers - 61.0%.
Appendix Table A2 shows the match rates by major industry and by gender, calculated












































































































































































































































































































































































































Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Age:
    Mean Age 38.1 36.9 38.0 36.5 38.0 36.4 38.7 36.5 36.9 36.3 37.9 36.3
    Fraction ≤ 30 years old 0.30 0.33 0.30 0.34 0.30 0.34 0.28 0.36 0.31 0.35 0.31 0.35
    Fraction ≥ 50 years old 0.19 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.19 0.13 0.20 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.13
Education:
    Mean Years Schooling 8.0 8.8 8.0 8.9 8.6 9.1 8.2 9.5 9.6 9.0 7.8 8.6
    Fraction with High School 0.18 0.23 0.18 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.18 0.28 0.22 0.25 0.17 0.24
    Fraction with Degree 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.23 0.14 0.07 0.11
Mean Log Real Hourly Wage 1.59 1.41 1.62 1.43 1.71 1.48 1.72 1.70 1.64 1.44 1.54 1.36
  (standard dev.) (0.55) (0.50) (0.55) (0.51) (0.58) (0.53) (0.58) (0.58) (0.63) (0.50) (0.48) (0.43)
Mean Monthly Hours 162.6 158.0 162.5 157.9 162.8 157.1 164.0 159.7 161.1 156.2 164.1 159.9
  (standard dev.) (24.7) (30.1) (24.8) (29.9) (24.0) (30.5) (22.5) (27.2) (25.9) (31.5) (23.6) (29.4)
Fraction in Lisbon 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.42 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.40 0.32 0.34
Fraction in Oporto 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.14
Mean Firm Size (No. emp's) 730 858 804 978 1,091 1,230 1034 1234 1339 1205 500 886
Fraction Females at Firm 0.24 0.70 0.24 0.70 0.30 0.64 0.25 0.43 0.52 0.67 0.24 0.67
Mean Log VA/Worker 3.05 2.88
Number person‐year obs. 9,070,492 7,226,310 8,225,752 6,334,039 6,012,521 5,012,736 4,295,906 1,716,615 949,869 4,062,867 5,786,148 4,204,851
Number of persons 2,119,687 1,747,492 1,889,366 1,505,517 1,450,288 1,247,503 1,026,308 423,980 223,896 1,023,607 1,441,626 1,082,058
























Origin/ Number of Percent 2 years 1 year  1 year 2 years
destination Changes of Changes before before after after    Raw Adjusted*
quartile (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Males
1 to 1 13,787 43.2 1.14 1.14 1.16 1.20 5.6 0.1
1 to 2 9,139 28.7 1.19 1.18 1.35 1.37 17.6 11.0
1 to 3 6,283 19.7 1.20 1.19 1.48 1.51 30.6 23.4
1 to 4 2,682 8.4 1.28 1.27 1.71 1.75 47.3 38.2
2 to 1 7,293 21.2 1.34 1.35 1.22 1.27 ‐6.5 ‐12.5
2 to 2 12,326 35.8 1.37 1.38 1.40 1.42 5.0 ‐1.3
2 to 3 10,356 30.0 1.41 1.42 1.54 1.57 15.9 8.8
2 to 4 4,496 13.0 1.49 1.49 1.81 1.84 35.3 26.3
3 to 1 4,356 11.9 1.49 1.52 1.24 1.30 ‐19.4 ‐26.1
3 to 2 8,835 24.2 1.54 1.55 1.45 1.48 ‐5.8 ‐12.7
3 to 3 15,107 41.3 1.61 1.63 1.65 1.67 6.4 ‐0.8
3 to 4 8,246 22.6 1.73 1.75 1.94 1.97 24.7 15.3
4 to 1 1,634 5.4 1.79 1.83 1.39 1.43 ‐36.2 ‐43.8
4 to 2 3,245 10.7 1.82 1.86 1.58 1.61 ‐20.9 ‐28.7
4 to 3 6,589 21.7 1.93 1.97 1.85 1.88 ‐5.2 ‐13.7
4 to 4 18,830 62.1 2.29 2.32 2.41 2.45 15.9 5.3
Females
1 to 1 24,130 60.9 1.05 1.04 1.05 1.08 2.9 ‐1.0
1 to 2 9,094 23.0 1.10 1.10 1.21 1.23 13.2 7.9
1 to 3 4,490 11.3 1.13 1.14 1.35 1.37 23.6 17.1
1 to 4 1,888 4.8 1.25 1.26 1.59 1.62 37.0 28.8
2 to 1 6,705 29.8 1.20 1.22 1.12 1.16 ‐4.5 ‐9.5
2 to 2 7,711 34.3 1.26 1.28 1.28 1.31 4.2 ‐1.7
2 to 3 5,495 24.5 1.33 1.35 1.44 1.46 12.6 5.8
2 to 4 2,562 11.4 1.44 1.45 1.69 1.73 29.0 19.8
3 to 1 3,283 16.7 1.38 1.40 1.15 1.20 ‐17.4 ‐23.5
3 to 2 4,762 24.2 1.42 1.45 1.34 1.37 ‐4.5 ‐11.6
3 to 3 7,245 36.8 1.51 1.53 1.54 1.56 5.3 ‐1.7
3 to 4 4,381 22.3 1.64 1.66 1.81 1.86 22.0 12.5
4 to 1 1,014 6.2 1.60 1.64 1.32 1.36 ‐24.6 ‐31.9
4 to 2 1,516 9.2 1.72 1.76 1.54 1.58 ‐13.7 ‐22.0
4 to 3 2,844 17.3 1.82 1.86 1.76 1.81 ‐1.3 ‐10.0









All Males All Females Males  Females Males  Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Standard deviation of log wages 0.554 0.513 0.578 0.480 0.548 0.634
Number of person‐year observations 8,225,752 6,334,039 1,766,441 5,220,256 6,160,204 861,451
Summary of Parameter Estimates:
Number person effects 1,889,366 1,505,517 419,632 1,243,694 1,394,283 194,788
Number firm effects 216,459 185,086 70,170 169,100 178,332 33,633
Std. dev. of person effects (across person‐yr obs.) 0.420 0.400 0.456 0.372 0.414 0.529
Std. dev. of firm effects (across person‐yr obs.) 0.247 0.213 0.281 0.209 0.249 0.267
Std. dev. of Xb (across person‐yr obs.) 0.069 0.059 0.078 0.058 0.065 0.063
Correlation of person/firm effects 0.167 0.152 0.036 0.120 0.169 0.055
RMSE of model 0.143 0.125 0.137 0.123 0.143 0.128
Adjusted R‐squared of model 0.934 0.940 0.944 0.934 0.932 0.960
Comparison job‐match effects model:
Number of job‐match effects 2,689,648 2,087,590 577,323 1,744,992 2,026,222 265,844
RMSE of match‐effects model 0.128 0.113 0.128 0.112 0.129 0.119
Adjusted R‐squared of match‐effects model 0.946 0.951 0.953 0.946 0.944 0.965
Std. deviation of job match effect 0.062 0.054 0.048 0.052 0.061 0.046
Inequality decomposition of two‐way fixed effects model:
Share of variance of log wages due to:
            person effects 57.6 61.0 62.3 60.2 57.2 69.5
            firm effects 19.9 17.2 23.5 18.9 20.6 17.7
            covariance of person and firm effects 11.4 9.9 2.7 8.1 11.6 3.9
            Xb and associated covariances 6.2 7.5 7.4 8.0 5.5 5.9










1.   Mean log wage of group 1.715 1.481 0.234
(100.0)
Means of Estimated Firm Effects:
2.  Firm Effects for Males  (                 ) 0.148 0.114 0.035
(14.9)









Note: Sample includes male and female workers in "dual connected" set -- see Table 1, 
columns 5-6. Estimated firm effects are from models described in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.  
Entries in parentheses are percents of the overall male-female wage gap in the dual connected 
sample that are explained by the differenced component.
Table 4b: Contribution of Firm‐Level Pay Components to Gender Wage Gap at Dual Connected Firms, by Age/Education
Male Prem. Female Prem. Using M Using F Using M Using F
Among Men Among Women Effects Effects Distribution Distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All  0.234 0.148 0.099 0.049 0.035 0.047 0.003 0.015
(21.2) (14.9) (19.9) (1.2) (6.3)
By Age Group:
Up to age 30 0.099 0.114 0.087 0.028 0.019 0.029 ‐0.001 0.009
(28.2) (18.9) (29.3) 1.2 (9.3)
Ages 31‐40 0.228 0.156 0.111 0.045 0.029 0.040 0.004 0.016
(19.7) (12.6) (17.8) (1.9) (7.0)
Over Age 40 0.336 0.169 0.099 0.069 0.050 0.064 0.005 0.019
(20.6) (15.0) (19.1) (1.5) (5.6)
By Education Group:
< High School 0.286 0.115 0.055 0.059 0.045 0.061 ‐0.002 0.015
(20.8) (15.6) (21.4) 0.6 (5.2)
High School 0.262 0.198 0.137 0.061 0.051 0.051 0.010 0.010
(23.3) (19.6) (19.5) (3.8) (3.7)
University 0.291 0.259 0.213 0.047 0.025 0.029 0.018 0.022











Male Prem. Female Prem. Using M Using F Using M Using F
Among Men Among Women Effects Effects Distribution Distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
a. All Workers at Dual Connected Firms
0.234 0.148 0.099 0.049 0.035 0.047 0.003 0.015
(21.2) (14.9) (19.9) (1.2) (6.3)
0.240 0.127 0.097 0.031 0.026 0.043 ‐0.012 0.005
(12.8) (10.8) (17.8) (‐5.1) (1.9)
0.137 0.177 0.133 0.044 0.015 0.027 0.016 0.028































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
47,477 0.156 0.137 0.879
(0.006) (0.006) (0.031)
42,667 0.155 0.136 0.136 0.879 0.875
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.032) (0.043)
14,638 0.138 0.128 0.129 0.924 0.933





































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Age 38.25 37.21 38.25 36.99 38.31 38.07
Mean Education 7.99 8.49 8.03 8.41 8.22 8.80
Mean Firm Size (workers in QP) 631 1024 668 1159 948 488
Mean Fraction of Females at Firm 0.29 0.59 0.29 0.62 0.30 0.50
Mean Log Real Hourly Wage 2006 1.62 1.40 1.63 1.37 1.68 1.52
  (standard deviation) (0.48) (0.44) (0.48) (0.41) (0.49) (0.54)
Mean Log Real Hourly Wage 2009 1.70 1.48 1.70 1.44 1.75 1.60
  (standard deviation) (0.48) (0.44) (0.48) (0.41) (0.50) (0.54)
Mean Log Value Added per Worker 2006 0.76 0.59 0.77 0.56 0.84 0.72
  (standard deviation) (0.50) 0.49 (0.49) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50)
Mean Log Value Added per Worker 2009 0.76 0.58 0.77 0.55 0.82 0.71
  (standard deviation) (0.51) (0.50) (0.51) (0.49) (0.52) (0.52)






















Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1. All Firms 0.049 0.092 0.045 0.091 0.912
   (n=33,104) (0.007) (0.020) (0.008) (0.020) (0.086)
          first stage F 231.95 231.95 45.02
2. Firms with Females 0.049 0.092 0.044 0.086 0.893 0.043 0.075 0.869
in Mainly Fem. Occ's (0.008) (0.021) (0.008) (0.021) (0.088) (0.008) (0.022) (0.100)
   (n=29,893)
          first stage F 208.80 208.80 40.58 208.80 40.58
2. Firms with Females 0.044 0.073 0.039 0.095 0.881 0.050 0.131 1.116
in Mainly Male Occ's (0.011) (0.028) (0.012) (0.029) (0.128) (0.013) (0.034) (0.204)
   (n=11,820)
































































































































































































































Males Females Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age:
    Mean Age 38.9 37.0 38.1 36.9
    Fraction ≤ 30 years old 0.28 0.32 0.30 0.33
    Fraction ≥ 50 years old 0.21 0.16 0.19 0.14
Education:
    Mean Years Schooling 8.0 8.8 8.0 8.8
    Fraction with High School 0.18 0.23 0.18 0.23
    Fraction with University Degree 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.13
Mean Log Real Hourly Wage 1.61 1.42 1.59 1.41
  (standard dev.) (0.58) (0.52) (0.55) (0.50)
Mean Monthly Hours 161.9 156.7 162.6 158.0
  (standard dev.) (25.9) (31.8) (24.7) (30.1)
Fraction in Lisbon 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.35
Fraction in Oporto 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Mean Firm Size (Number employees) 668 839 730 858
Fraction Female Workers at Firm 0.25 0.66 0.24 0.70
Number person‐year obs. 11,651,615 9,011,089 9,070,492 7,226,310
Number of persons 2,550,576 2,040,863 2,119,687 1,747,492












in Industry Matched from Females Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 All Industries 100.0 70.9 44.3 73.3 67.8
 Agriculture 1.7 52.0 40.6 50.9 53.7
 Fishing 0.1 84.2 27.1 82.2 89.5
 Mining 0.4 80.8 9.7 80.5 83.7
 Food Products 3.5 75.2 49.1 74.9 75.6
 Textiles 8.0 81.3 71.7 80.9 81.5
 Wood Products 2.8 78.3 27.0 76.7 82.6
 Paper 1.5 79.3 34.5 77.4 82.8
 Chemicals 1.8 82.2 34.2 80.8 84.9
 Other Mineral Products 2.0 81.4 29.3 81.0 82.4
 Metal Fabrication 7.0 80.4 25.8 80.0 81.6
 Utilities 0.8 86.5 17.7 87.3 82.7
 Construction 12.4 69.5 8.3 69.0 74.1
 Trade 19.5 79.4 46.6 79.8 78.9
 Hotels 6.6 75.7 62.4 78.2 74.3
 Transportation 5.9 71.9 22.9 72.9 68.5
 Finance 2.8 27.5 44.4 27.6 27.3
 Business Services  10.6 82.6 49.1 83.5 81.6
 Education 2.1 42.8 76.2 44.1 42.5
 Health 5.9 35.9 88.3 44.1 34.8
 Recreation Services 1.0 64.2 44.2 66.4 61.5














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
47,477 0.140 0.117 0.839
(0.006) (0.007) (0.036)
42,667 0.139 0.116 0.115 0.838 0.831
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.037) (0.045)
14,638 0.127 0.107 0.115 0.845 0.907




































1. Rent sharing coefficient (from row 1 of Table 5) 0.156 0.137 0.019
2. Mean "excess VA/L" 0.743 0.566 0.178
3. Firm‐specific Component of Wages Attributable to  0.116 0.078 0.038
     Measured Productivity (= row 1 × row 2) (16.5)
4. Total Firm‐specific Component of Wages (from Table 4b) 0.148 0.099 0.049
(21.2)
Counterfactuals:
a. Assign females the male firm effects 0.116 0.088 0.028
  (sorting effect, using male coefficients) (11.9)
b. Calculate mean female firm effect using male firm distribution 0.116 0.102 0.014
  (bargaining effect, using male distribution) (6.0)
c. Assign males the female firm effects 0.102 0.078 0.024
  (sorting effect, using female coefficients) (10.4)














Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1. All Firms 0.035 0.075 0.031 0.071 0.894
   (n=33,104) (0.006) (0.016) (0.006) (0.016) (0.091)
          first stage F 159.26 159.26 39.31
2. Firms with Females 0.035 0.075 0.031 0.066 0.883 0.031 0.060 0.906
in Mainly Fem. Occ's (0.006) (0.017) (0.006) (0.016) (0.094) (0.006) (0.017) (0.109)
   (n=29,893)
          first stage F 144.48 144.48 35.28 144.48 35.28
2. Firms with Females 0.030 0.065 0.025 0.077 0.856 0.029 0.098 0.991
in Mainly Male Occ's (0.008) (0.022) (0.008) (0.023) (0.141) (0.009) (0.027) (0.215)
   (n=11,820)
          first stage F 76.74 76.74 11.56 76.74 11.56
Notes: See Table 7.  Dependent variable is average change in wages of male or female workers from 2006 to 2009 at a firm (regression‐adjusted 
for quadratic in age). Table entries are coefficients of the change in log of excess value added per worker from 2006 to 2009 at the firm. IV 
models use change in excess log value added per worker from 2007 to 2008 as instrument.  Ratios in columns 5, 8, 11 are estimated by IV, 
treating average change in female wages as dependent variable, average change in male wages as endogenous explanatory variable, and 
change in excess log value added per worker from 2006 to 2009 as the instrument.  Standard errors, clustered by firm, in parentheses.  
All Female Stayers
Female Stayers in "Female" 
Occupations
Female Stayers in "Male" 
OccupationsAll Male Stayers
